obama and axlerod and those guys are to be believed, they always seem to think there is some chance for rationality to prevail. and i think the other alternate question to ask is what if mitt romney wins and there's a republican house, republican senate? will the democrats have a meeting with whoever the democratic version of frank luntz is and make a similar decision? i think not. and i think democrats don't have quite the appetite for payback. but i'm sure a lot of democrats will be wishing they did if, in fact, this is the outcome in november. so, yeah. how it plays out across the washington and whether people will be socialed at all and realize -- sobered at all and realize that, you know, we don't want the prosperity we've known,

the future we've known to really be squandered simply because nobody can make a decision, um, maybe when it gets to that point, the democracy will respond. i'd like to think that's the case. so concern.-- [laughter] that's as close as i can get to optimism. >> eleanor, thank you for this. you've been wonderful. thanks to c-span. thanks for your questions. [applause] now you're going to get a chance to sign books. >> okay, terrific. thank you. >> and, um, all of you, please, help us with the chairs. >> all right. >> that was great. >> you're watching 48 hours of nonfiction authors and books on c-span2's booktv. >> you're watching booktv. coming up next, henry crumpton talks about the role that the cia plays in the world today and discusses what the organization

accomplished in afghanistan in the weeks following the 9/11 attacks. this is about an hour. >> good evening, everyone. on behalf of the tattered cover bookstore, it's my pleasure to welcome you and to thank you for your support. ambassador henry crumpton is the founder of crumpton group, a strategic international advisory and business development firm which works with global corporations including those in the infrastructure, energy and financial services industries. he advises ceos and their teams on the political, security and commercial die too manics -- dynamics in emerging and frontier markets. ambassador crumpton joins the cia's clandestine service in 1981 as an operations officer. for most of his 24-year career, he operated in the foreign field including assignments as chief of station. in washington he served at the fbi as deputy chief of

international terrorism operations section. he was deputy chief at the cia's counterterrorism center, and in 2001 and 2002 he led the cia's afghanistan campaign. he then became chief of the cia's national resources division. and from 2005 until 2007, ambassador crumpton served as coordinator for counterterrorism a at the u.s. department of state. for his service ambassador crumpton has been honored with many commendations including the cia's highest award for achievement. we're delighted that ambassador henry crumpton is with us this evening to present his new book, "the art of intelligence." lessons from a life in the cia's clandestine service. would you, please, join me now in welcoming ambassador henry crumpton. [applause] >> charles, thank you for that

great introduction and for the opportunity to come speak at this, at this store. it's really a privilege. tattered cover has been in the denver area for more than 40 years providing a great service to the community, and we were talking earlier. you noted that the tattered cover hosts between 500-600 events a year. that's pretty remarkable. so thanks for what you and all your colleagues do for the denver community. i'd like to recognize some people here, if i may. bill owen, thank you for coming, former governor of colorado, dear friend for many years. i'm honored that you could attend. paul and marlene, god bless you, i love you both. my family, my wife, my parents, one of our sons who just graduated from college, and my brother-in-law steve, thank you all for joining me tonight. makes it very special.

the topic is intelligence. why is it important? why will it be of greater importance? and what should we do, we as citizens, and i include myself in that category, private citizens. i left goth service more than five -- government service more than five years ago, and as i reflect back on my many years in the government -- 24 in the cia and 18 months serving undersecretary rice as a coordinator for counterterrorism -- and follow current events, i believe that intelligence is going to be of much greater importance. why is that? primarily because of the growing complexity our nation faces in the battlefield, in the marketplace, really in all aspects of life. there are three variables i'd like to underscore very briefly

that i think impact on this global landscape. the first is the asymmetry of power. 9/11, 9 guys with box -- 19 guys with box cutters. did they compel us to spend maybe $2 trillion? that's breathtaking when we think about it. the impact of a single cameraman working for al-qaeda capturing some horrible images, uploading this into cyberspace, having immediate global impact advancing the propaganda of al-qaeda and their allies. one cameraman having global impact within minutes, maybe even seconds. what about that single hacker who is able to infect thousands, tens of thousands, maybe more computer systems around the world in seconds? these are just a couple of

examples, but it underscores the point that the asymmetry of power is growing. and it's not just in terms of threats and risk, also opportunities. who would have thought someone like zuckerberg eight years ago would be able to build a company like facebook? and think how many people, individuals, small companies, entities that facebook and other social media, mediums have been able to empower. that's a tremendous asymmetry of power, challenging the status quo. and that trend is growing. in fact, i think it's accelerating. the second variable, the role of nonstate actors. when we used to think about war, conflict not very long ago it was nation-state on nation-state primarily. always been irregular forces, of course, always irregular

warfare, but more often than not today when we think about threats to the united states, we think about risk we're talking about nonstate actors; al-qaeda, hezbollah, the narco traffickers south of our border and within the united states, these transnational cartels. they have $25-$40 billion a year of revenue, mostly from consumers in the u.s. and they're growing influence not just in the u.s., central america, but into west africa and into europe. it's a nonstate actor. there are many other examples. but also the positive side. universities, nonprofits, clergy, media, private companies like the tattered cover, this bookstore. more and more when we think about the variables along this global landscape we're thinking

about nonstate actors. in afghanistan after our efforts immediately preceding 9/11 in informing looking back on -- afghanistan looking back on that, i realize that the most important ally we had in that fight was not a nation-state, it was not nato, nonstate actors. those afghan tribal leaders scattered throughout the country. they were our best ally in that fight. and you see that repeated in many places around the world. the third variable is the global battlefield. i talked about that single hacker or that single al-qaeda operative with those horrible images uploading in cyberspace? well, more and more our enemies, our adversaries can plot and plan on one side of the world and execute on the other in

days, hours or in cyberspace we're talking seconds. so if you look at these three variables -- the asymmetry of power, the growing role of nonstate actors and this platte, complex -- flat, complex, fragile, global battlefield, if you will, the emergence and convergence of those variables, we have never seen this in the history of human conflict. and so when we think about, well, what are the risks out there, who are our enemies, how do we define them, how do we find them, and then once we do, how do we engage them, these are questions that are meant for intelligence collectors and analysis to inform policymakers and other consumers of intelligence. so they can make better decisions, they can launch better, more precise, more refined operations that advance the interest of not just the

u.s., but also our allies. let me give you an example in afghanistan after 9/11. when kandahar fell december 7, 2001, it was the last urban stronghold of the taliban. how many americans were on the ground at that time? bear in mind that a quarter of al-qaeda leadership had been killed, 10, 20, maybe 30,000 or more of the enemy, al-qaeda and the taliban, had been killed on the battlefield. their leadership was routed, they were on their way to pakistan. how many americans were on the ground? less than 500. this was less than 90 days after 9/11. and when i hear about the u.s. invasion of afghanistan after 9/11, i grind my teeth because it was not an invasion.

and that's a key point here. it was not just a u.s. victory, it was an afghan victory. because we through our networks which were informed by our intelligence collection over the years, we knew who our enemy was, we knew who our allies were, and we also understood our perspective allies, potential l a lies -- allies, and we worked to bring them to our side. intelligence that was very granular, very specific at a local level. when 9/11 happened, the cia had more than 100 sources in every province, among every tribe, among every society in afghanistan. these were networks built over the last two years. we had mapped the human terrain, not just the physical terrain.

we understood not just the enemy, but our friends and our potential friends and allies. that's how we were able working very closely with central command and special operations command to forge strategy that brought us that initial success. the late speaker of the house, that great american politician tip o'neill, he stressed that all politics is local. well, when you look at some of the risks that we face, this global landscape that i describe, that's also true for intelligence collection. you have to understand those neighborhoods, those villages, those valleys, the people. because with this growing asymmetry of power and the role of nonstate actors on this flat, complex, complicated global arena, we have to understand not just the threat, not just the

enemy, but the human terrain. more and more this type of conflict that we face driven by nonstate actors and some states like iran, north korea and others that support terrorist groups that sometimes direct substate actors like the quds qs force in iran, they pose challenges, but it really is, i believe, more about the conflicts among the people. and this is in particular where human intelligence is important. let me also talk about all source intelligence that helped inform our planning and our operations in afghanistan prior to 9/11. wasn't just the human networks i talked about. signals intelligence, collection of information from the atmosphere, collection in cyberspace, satellite imagery and use of the predator drone. we were driven to that technical

collection, that particular platform out of a degree of frustration. we had human sources in afghanistan that were leading us to al-qaeda, to bin laden for the years prior to 9/11. but policymakers in washington were unsatisfied with our reporting, did not trust our human sources. they wanted eyes on, if you will. american eyes on. we offered to send cia teams deeper in enemy territory. and bear in mind we started sending cia teams in afghanistan in september of 1999 to work with our afghan allies, to collect intelligence, to engage in some very limited, very modest covert action. so the reporting we were generating was insufficient according to the policy policym, to our masters, if you will. so we looked to technical means because we could not get approval to deploy our teams

further into afghanistan. we looked at all kind of different technical solutions and came up with a predator which had been proven in the balkans. so we knew it worked. it was a reliable platform, and so with a remarkable effort which i describe in my book of a handful of policymakers and a handful of what i fondly recall some subversive bureaucrats not just in the cia's counterterrorism center, but in the military, other elements of the intelligence community, in a matter of months they put this package together, this platform, this system which we deployed into afghanistan. and sure enough, driven by intelligence collection from our sources on the ground we were able to find bin laden. and there was a "60 minutes" clip that ran last sunday, and there's an image of bin laden highlighted.

that was taken from the video of that surveillance platform off that predator. this was in the summer of 2000. a year before 9/11. but even with that intelligence, with that confirmation we did not have sufficient authorities or resources to engage with lethal force against bin laden then. and that's what led us to strap on the hellfire missiles which was another bureaucratic adventure. the technology, in fact, apparently was not that difficult. it would have been for me personally, but for our technical staff they said it wasn't that hard. but what was hard was figuring out how do you strap on an army hellfire weapon to an air force platform under the command of the cia? [laughter] that was a miracle. and, again, they did this in just a few months. in february 2001 the first successful test shot of the

hellfire missile was spot on. and now it's one of the most precise, adaptable, flexible weapons we have in our arsenal. the hellfire warhead is about 20 pounds, and you can direct it exactly where you want it from a long way away. driven by necessity. what about threats we face now? let me just talk brief he about that -- briefly about that. it's not just al-qaeda and the allies. they dominate the news. in fact, in the last few months you see al-qaeda affiliates surfacing. in yemen, full-scale war in southern yemen right now. a new terrorist group just claimed responsibility for that horrible attack in yemen. more than 100 people killed, i think 105 at last count, hundreds wounded. in syria another group just

surfaced, claiming responsibility for an attack. even in afghanistan an offshoot of the taliban has claimed responsibility for some horrific attacks. three new nonstate actors have just popped up recently. so they dominate the news and, of course, al-qaeda and their affiliates particularly al-qaeda in the arabian peninsula based in that safe haven in southern yemen, they have tried to attack us in the homeland on three occasions. using aircraft coming our way. but there are many others. iran and their substate actor, quds force, their intelligence service, their proxy force, hezbollah. before 9/11 hezbollah killed more americans than any other

terrorist group. i believe we've been in a proxy war with iran since is the 79 -- 1979. i'm not sure many of our policymakers understand that or realize that, but that's been a long time. and you have an iranian regime, one of the most corrupt on the face of the earth, seeking to develop a capability to at some point build a nuclear weapon. that's the threat. another threat, and i only make passing reference to this in the book, but it's the espionage threat focused on the u.s. i don't know this, but i would guess there are more hostile intelligence officers inside the united states now than at the height of the cold war. and a significant part of that's focused on industrial espionage, intellectual capital that we have near the u.s. here in the u.s. cyberspace, i referred to that. weapons of mass destruction, biological weapons in

particular, i'm particularly concerned about that. talk about an intelligence challenge, how do you locate that one biochemist who's got the ingredients, and he's working in a small laboratory, maybe a kitchen that has been refitted? how do you find him? what are his capabilities? and what are his plans, what are his intentions? that's a tough intelligence target. bw, that's a big problem. what about russia and china, these emerging powers? what about china? i believe china poses an espionage threat to us. they're sophisticated, they're aggressive, but i'm also concerned about the stability in china. we need a strong china that

increasingly adopts, embraces liberal values and liberal institutions. they are paramount when you look at the economies of east asia. they're an important partner in trade and commerce and battling transnational threats whether it's terrorism, other crime. we need a strong china, but one that we can trust at least to a larger degree than we can today. russia, powerful country, great resources. what's going to happen there in this transition with putin and his new leadership role? resuming that paramount title. and in these great nations that are emerging so rapidly -- brazil, indonesia, india -- what roles do they play? what will be the geopolitical impact? many complexities, many questions. i have never seen in my adult

life so many questions that intelligence must address. and you look at the risks, they're complex, they're many. i'm not sure if the world's more dangerous now than it was during the cold war, though, when we lived under mutual destruction, it's a different type of threat, a different type of risk. i also think there are greater opportunities out there too. if you look at the proliferation of liberal institution, media, universities, the arab spring, great opportunities. but also this raised many questions that we need to address, i think, through intelligence to inform our policymakers and others whether they're in the military, law enforcement, diplomacy trade. so for all of you thinking of a career in the intelligence

service, i would encourage you. it's a growth industry. [laughter] let me close there. i really do welcome a lot of questions and answers and a discussion here and, again, thank you for coming, and i'll open the floor up. [applause] >> how concerned are you about, um, other countries or units like al-qaeda getting ahold of the predator used against us, uavs? >> yeah, it's a great question. right now there are 40 countries that are engaged in the development and production of their own unmanned aerial systems, including iran. we know that. there's really no way to keep that in a bottle. so much of this is unclassified. it's commercially available.

and it poses a particular threat to the u.s. how do we build a defensive strategy against those, those threats, those airframes? we're in the process of doing that. i think we have a long way to go. and moreover, it's not only the lethal threat, it's their intelligence collection capabilities against our, not just our homeland, but particularly our troops and our embassies and other installations that are scattered all over the world. and it will be a growing counterintelligence problem for us, how do we defend ourselves existence that type of -- against that type of technical collection. big problem. good question, thank you. >> i was wondering if you had any thoughts or concerns about the militarization of the cia like you're talking about the uavs and whether you think it will hinder the intelligence it

needs to correct? >> that's a great question. i talked with general david petraeus about this not long ago. this is an imperative to protect american forces overseas. there's just no way around that. and it's a sacred mission, if you will. and the cia plays an important role in that, supporting the military, protecting lives of our men and women in uniform. there is, however, a danger that this imperative takes us away from the more traditional, more strategic issues about geopolitical powers, russia, china, this threat coming from mexico, how do we work with our mexican partners to do a much better job which i think we need to do? there's a stress, there's a strain. and the cia's a very small organization, and the clandestine service in the cia is even smaller. you're talking about just a handful of people really. and how they are able to cover

the waterfront, really tough. and moreover o, if i could expand your question, i'm concerned not only about the militarization of intelligence, but the militarization of policy. when we look at the world and we think in military terms -- and part of that is the success of our military, they're very adaptable, they're aggressive, they've done some terrific work, and they want a leadership role where, i believe, other parts of the u.s. government are less aggressive. in fact, more reluctant. particularly to assume a leadership role this some of these expeditionary, high-risk environments. we do a really good job of projecting military power, covert action power driven by this intelligence. the number three guy in al-qaeda in south asia in the afghan/pakistan theater, the last decade his life expectancy's been about six

months. it's a job nobody wants. so if you're the number three guy, the chief operating officer, if you will, the guy that has to run operations for al-qaeda in that part of the world, you've got a pretty grim future. it's because of this intelligence, this covert action, this military we are brilliant, i believe, at finding and engaging and killing the enemy. it took us a decade to find bin laden, but we got him. where when you do a lot more work is in the non-military, non-covert action part of our policy. how can the united states, how can we project this non-military power all around the world, particularly in some of these expeditionary environments? what is the role of state department, of commerce, of justice, of others? how can we secure those initial victories? it pains me when i look at afghanistan, the success we had

in '01 and '02 and the relative stability from '02-'05 where the afghans were just waiting for the international community to come forward and to help them. not just the u.s., but the community of nations failed to project this non-military power. energy, education, health care. now, we've spent billions and billions -- wasted most of it, i believe. we're exceedingly inefficient in doing that part of our mission. so when you talk about militarization of intelligence, it's also of policy. and i don't necessarily blame the military. in fact, i admire them. they're charging hard. they're going forward. i'd like to see the rest of the u.s. government in this fight. when i say "fight," i'm not just talking about engaging with lethal force against the enemy. these villages and valleys that we have secured and we can

secure, that hard power application, that's essential, it's critical because it's stopping the enemy from attacking us in our homeland. but that's only the first 10, 20%. what happens after that? how do you have an enduring victory? >> hello. i'm with a major u.s. air carrier. we have multiple operations in africa, and we have our crews laying over in places like nigeria. so my concern is bleedover from yemen into other parts of africa, the security of our crews when they're laying over in those countries. do you see, you know, al-qaeda and those other operations going throughout those regions and other parts of africa? would you perceive westerners as

being at risk in those countries? >> i think it depends where you are in africa. it's a mass i continent. you have -- massive continue innocent. you have more than 50 countries, and it varies greatly. by biggest concern right now is somalia, obviously. but the u.s. and our allies, they've done a pretty good job of containing al-shabaab, an al-qaeda affiliate there. and it's not isolated. i mean, there was two or three years ago a pretty serious attempt by some ethnic somalis in australia to launch terrorist attacks, one of the best in the world, they were able to uncover this plot, undermine it and to capture those involved. well, there was a link back back to somalia. so when i talk about the global landscape, that's an example. in africa, though, you've got a growing concern in north africa.

if you look at instability in libya, there was just a coup in mali. that's been driven more by tribal dissatisfaction, but anytime you've got conflict, anytime you've got political confusion it provides al-qaeda an opportunity. that's what's happening in yemen, that's what's happening in syria, and i'm afraid that's what's going to happen in parts of north africa. so somalia, we've been focused on it for years. we're doing, i think, an adequate job for now, and thanks in large part to our african allies there. north africa i'm a little more worried about. i'm also concerned about nigeria. this tells you a lot about the al-qaeda affiliates and our adversaries. if you look at the local language, it basically means down with western education. in other words, down with liberal values, liberal institutions. i believe that africa offers a

lot of promise, a lot of opportunity if you look at the growth in ghana, tanzania, enormous resources, and you have this middle class that's growing, that's really challenging the status quo. and i spent ten years in africa, different countries. so in some respects i'm very bullish, very positive about africa. but acknowledging there are risks. but i believe that they can be mitigated. and the u.s. needs to be there. look at the chinese, indians, russians, others are in there competing in these capital markets, in these free enterprise opportunities. the u.s. needs to be in there. and projecting that non-military power. it's not just u.s. government, it's companies like yours, private enterprise that goes into places like africa and affords the opportunity, the capabilities for africans to come visit our country, become educated here and then go back

home and help spread these liberal values that i think are so important in our overall strategy. here maybe? >> um, it seems like there's been a number of politicians, congressmen, the increase to they're stepping up their vocalization in syria or intervening, directly or otherwise. >> right. >> and i'm curious what you think the united states' stance should be about that situation, hands on, hands off, somewhere in between? >> well, i think we should be a little more aggressive. i believe that the key strategic, geopolitical strategic issue when we step back and look at the middle east is that syria is really the only ally of iran in the middle east. if we pull syria out of that iranian orbit, or let me rephrase that. if we help empower the syrian

people to do what they want to do and pull the assad regime down and, therefore, pull syria out of the iranian orbit, that will immediately undermine the connections, the networks of hezbollah in lebanon which poses a direct threat not just on israel, but i think on the liberal institutions and these growing entrepreneurial middle class citizens that we see throughout the middle east. so i think there's a big strategic opportunity. and how we do this is important. now, you've got qatar, saudi arabia and others, i believe, are already supplying arms to the free syrian army. the united states government is supplying nonlethal aid, communications gear and others. beyond that i don't know what we're doing, but i hope it's more than what i know or what the public knows. because if we're not in there helping the syrian people, well, we're not competing. and al-qaeda is there.

and other illiberal groups are there trying to influence and drive the future of syria. now, exceedingly complex i don't argue for putting u.s. troops on the ground there. in fact, you've already seen some spillover into lebanon. and it's going to get a lot worse before it gets better there. but we, we have to engage at some point, i believe. good question, thank you. this gentleman here: >> this is a little trivial, but the question in relation to terrorist activities. social networking enterprises and industries such as facebook that involve 700 million people and revenue of, like, $40 billion plus annually, what type of controlling factor other than an organization that i read about in "the wall street journal" called the technocrats that's being established would the central intelligence agency

play in dealing with 700 million people and social networking? what type of -- >> well, i've been out of the cia for more than seven years, so i can't tell you what they're doing in social networks, and even if i did know, i wouldn't be able to discuss it. i'll make a general comment that may address your question. i believe that this new technology that's proliferating around the globe and is being manifest in some social media like facebook, like others, linkedin's another great example, this provides a great opportunity for individuals and these liberal institutions i talked about, it empowers them. it connects them. and that advances our strategic objective in the united states. and i think that the intelligence community, not just the cia, needs to understand how this will impact those communities. egypt is a prime example. they have an election there

tomorrow. basically led by these young, brave technocrats that organize through social media and overthrew the mubarak regime. they really led that revolution. they're increasingly sidelined and marginalized, yet they still have power particularly through their social media. and if you look at some to have illiberal actors and groups in egypt that are vying for power in concert with the egyptian military, how does all that play out? so it poses a unique and challenging intelligence collection imperative, i believe, for the cia. so a very general answer, but i hope that suffices. >> so you've mentioned the energy word a couple of times in your remarks. i wonder how much you see the energy issues and crisises being the nexus of conflict in the 23st century -- 21st century, and what should the u.s. be doing in that regard? >> yeah, energy's crucial for lots of reasons.

let me address your question then i'd also like to give you a micro example of how energy can be strategic in some of our efforts. the u.s. has through the power of private enterprise uncovered a vast wealth of natural gas within our borders. it's breathtaking, the impact this will have on our country. i think we should seize that opportunity. we should do it responsibly, we should look at the environmental impact, of course, but we should charge ahead. and also look at solar, bio, wind, all the other aspects of energy. and i have a bias, again, toward local solutions whether it's in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency or energy production. because what you do is you build a more resilient, stronger system, i believe. and right now if you look at our grid, our power grid, it's pretty fragile. given all these networks and links. i'd like to see that

decentralized more and more. and with natural gas and other types of energy, we can do that. sadly, we don't have a national energy strategy, at least not one that i know of. i think that should be one of the priorities for the next administration whoever that might be. another example in energy, talk about how you empower people through in this technology, through social networks? bear in mind in many parts of the world you don't have energy. and without energy how do you connect to the rest of the global community? and this goes to what sun sue taught us about understanding and attacking the enemy's strategy. if you look at large parts of southeast asia, particularly afghanistan, pakistan on that border area, what's the enemy's objective? they want to isolate those communities. they want to keep out western education, liberal values. they want to keep women

disenfranchised. that's their strategy. they want to control those villages. so our strategy, i believe, should be just the opposite. how do we open up these communities to the world? and in 2001 less than 6% of the afghan people were on the electric grid. fast forward today, probably 6, 7% are on the electric grid in afghanistan. complete and utter failure to provide the power to those afghanvillage. and you -- villages. and you look at the intensity of the solar radiation, look at all the biomass, look at the wind, boy, it blows hard in afghanistan, and that sun will scorch you. there's enormous opportunities there. and once you empower a village with energy, what's the first thing the villagers want to do? they want to get a cell phone. they want to talk to their cousin in the village next door. they want to educate their kids, they want to get a satellite link in there.

there's a great afghan entrepreneur who has got the rights for sesame street. he's translating sesame street into local languages. how do you find a way to get that into the villages? i'd love to see a broadcast of oprah, 20 years of oprah reruns. you broadcast that into every afghan village, you empower those women, you win. [laughter] >> i have two questions that are kind of interrelated, and it's, and it regards the saudi/u.s. ties. i've read that after 9/11 concern and my wife and i were outside the united states, and we couldn't fly in -- >> uh-huh. >> north american air space was closed except for one flight for saudi families of 160 people, i believe, that were allowed out. it was the only flight in or out for north american air space. i simply don't understand that.

the other side of this, again, for the u.s./saudi relationship, the saudis seem to be the financial wherewithal to their education of hatred of the west. and 16 of the 18 who were bombers were all saudis. and yet we seem to say that the saudis are our allies against this fight against all terror nhl the world. they -- all terrorism in the world. they seem to financially support terrorism. and i really would like to have your thoughts than one flight that was allowed out. >> the flight you're referring to was some of the saudi royal family here and their friends, and i have a very imperfect secondhand knowledge of this, i was not involved in that. but that was my understanding. and the saudis -- it's a very good question. the saudis are a critical ally in the counterterrorism fight. they also, i believe, pose a

political competitive challenge to us. if you look at their ideology, and let me talk about both those just very briefly. the saudis did very little to help us against al-qaeda and their affiliates until may of 2003. why is that important? because that's when al-qaeda started attacking saudi facilities, saudi targets inside saudi arabia. and the saudis responded, they did a 180 when that happened. i took a trip to saudi arabia to visit with the deputy minister of interior, prince nayeth. this was in 2006, i believe. this is when i was at the state department. and the message was for the prince to do more to fight al-qaeda. and i showed up and was greeted very warmly. i, in fact, was with fran

townsend who was homeland security adviser for president bush at the time. and we were kept waiting two, three hours. and finally he shows up. clearly worn out, he hadn't slept in a couple of days, big circles under his eyes. he had just lost two men in a fire fight against al-qaeda. it changed the tenor or -- of our discussion. and the saudis are increasingly effective allies when you look at al-qaeda. you look at the work they're doing with us in yemen, they played -- apparently, based on the media reports -- a key role in stopping the latest al-qaeda attack directed this way, the second underwear bomber. the saudis had an important role in that. ..

we should take them on. i talked to them about it, and we can do both. we can be allies against al-qaeda and they're affiliates, but just like we competed against communism and one, i think we can take this ideal is yon. the muslim brotherhood and others. again, it is an intelligence requirement. how do you define that threat? there is a spectrum. terrorist enemy over here, political, those votes that might be neutral call prospective allies, allies. out the work along the spectrum. >> that one plant that was allowed to leave?

>> i can't. i just know that they were important saudi citizens, including rules that were here. one some of them might have begun to school, but don't know any more than that. >> we have a relatively sheltered life compared to the rest of the world here in the united states. what is your view on homegrown terrorism and how we have to combat that on the intelligence level as opposed to outside al-qaeda forces that we hear about that seems to hit the news more often than not? >> good question. thanks. more and more cases of this, the fort hood example from 2009 is one of the most horrific, i think. i believe that first and foremost we need to acknowledge that freedom of religion, freedom of -- freedom of expression, illegal immigration into our country is essential to who we are.

that really helps us we've the strong fabric of american culture and american civic institutions. we must always keep that in mind, and we must always welcome those who want to come here who can contribute, i believe. that is sort of my starting points. i also must acknowledge those immigrants or recent immigrants who contributes to the fight. i give you an example. 20001 -- to muslim americans to accompany me to afghanistan brought skills i did not have and performed heroically and when people talk about the news had been, holy warriors and those wait -- waging jihad, that

is to think about. i am pretty torre that we have allowed al-qaeda and other us define the lexicon of this war. the term jihad in regular conversation, why do we confer upon them that title of holy warrior? i cannot think of anything more unholy. let me answer your question now. the homegrown threat, and not just recent immigrants allahu white americans that have been caught up in this. and not just those affiliated with al-qaeda. this growing risk that i talked about. first line of defense, if you will, is intelligence. and when we think of intelligence it is important that we don't defaults to this concept of an orwellian pervasive surveillance.

some in the u.s. government think that is an easy answer, cameras everywhere, this unblinking eye, that is the answer. it is not. in fact, it concerns me far given my emphasis on civil liberties here. the best intelligence solution to that is the beat cop, local clergy, local store owner and back, to cheer, parents, family, neighborhoods, communities, that is the best intelligence that we have. they can inform local law-enforcement, local civic leaders to help spot and blancs that problem. it takes more than that. it takes undercover operations, pre sophisticated intelligence work. the best example i know of is the nypd. they have been a very good job

in a very big, very complex city. other parts of the u.s. it is far less mature. i am concerned about our intelligence and the homeland buried it is fractured, homes to the far from complete and the need to do a much better job. the second part of that, education, and that is one reason i wrote this book, to illustrate the to the american public and to our leaders and to our allies risk, value, and the intelligence sobel distrusted network such talk about. good question. thank you. >> why did you decide to become a spy her and not a diplomat or something else is one question. when you talk to young people today he might be interested in joining the agency, what is your pitch? >> thank you. great question.

i recount this in the book to some dream. i was raised in a small town in tourism. my father herbert was a four-star. my mother, a teacher. they gave me a wonderful home environment, an environment where i was encouraged cannot read, learn, export intellectually and also physically, a great time growing up hunting and fishing and trying to keep up with my father . so i was exposed to the warren county library. did not have a bookstore. we did have a library. bell and love of books, particularly american history, the american revolution, irregular warfare, frances

marion, south carolina, some great stories there been. i was very, very young when i was exploring all of these books . i wrote to the cia when i was ten or 11 and got a response from some very fine bureaucrat in the cia. apparently this letter, i can only imagine what it was, a boy scrawling on notebook paper. they sent a very nice formal business letter saying, thank you for your interest, please reply. and that did. i was rejected again at age 91 and basically given the same answer, i needed to grow up a low bid more. and then being hard-headed i wait and a few months and went to a different office and reapplied and that time i got in. i was cheering, i think, by many motivations first of all, a sense of mission , a love for my country.

a very rich history of service to my nation and family. a lot, particularly vietnam, remember great high-school football heroes they graduated from high school and went to vietnam and a couple of them did not come back. the intellectual curiosity, sense of mission, patriotism, sense of tradition and family in the community, but for whatever reason it was not just military service but intelligence service that i was drawn to. all the james bond books and movies, so there was this romantic aspects, i'm sure. that was the way that i kept coming back to it. it was a great career. it exceeded my biggest boyhood dreams and am forever grateful to the cia and the u.s.

government and this nation for giving me an obscenity and privilege. i hope that is reflected in the book. i had a journalist a few days ago asking me if i wrote the book because @booktv -- asked me if it was a catharsis. i did not know he was talking about. why would i do that? this book is basically a note of thanks. my attempt to inform and educate , if i'm lucky into chain alone bedbug, and if i'm really lucky had conspired one or tuba schoolboys that are serving -- schoolboys that are interested in serving the nation to the intelligence service. at seven to follow their dreams car wherever that is.

fighting broke baseball farming community in georgia and lead our nation in a war after something as horrible as september 11th and if i can serve my nation has ambassador at large representative and country, president bush dreams are important, whether it is government service or teaching education, what a great and honorable profession that is. educating yourself and exploring and challenging yourself. >> concerned right your safety. a pretty dangerous mission. howdy protect yourself?

>> you're talking about when i was in the government? >> your personal safety. >> when i was serving the state? the cia, first of all, this green their applicants. there was a rigorous process. i went through all kinds of testing. psychological, security check and a polygraph examination, and they invest a lot of money in the screening process. once you get through that, for me, it was about 18 months of some pretty rigorous training which is also another screening process. you have to complete this training to be certified to serve overseas in the clandestine world. so that is one aspect. the training was very good. a lot of fun. they call it tradecraft, counter surveillance was a big part of that. some personal security tactics, a basic driving, aggressive

driving, shooting, just a whole range of different tactics and techniques and procedures that we employed. varies greatly on the environment. if you are in a restricted environment we have a hostile and intense security service in counter surveillance is really paramount. paramount to any operation. if you're an a battlefield and worm more permissive environments where other tactics . driver around at night during through roadblock armed by adjourned teenage soldiers, i did that scores of times. howdy negotiate through the roadblock, give them a pack of

cigarettes or beer or five bucks . howdy remover through that. particularly if you have a foreign national, in spite, one of your sources in the car with you. another example is dealing with volunteers, people that my call and, they tell their cousins, i have an important information. me this time, the street corner. you have to make a judgment, is it worth making a meeting, and if you do, what tradecraft you employ. what tactics and procedures to you put in place.

i did that scores of times. those are fairly routine but fairly high risk. i hope that gives you a couple of examples of life in clandestine service when you are beating agents to recruiting agents, stealing. again, it was a lot of fun, breaking and entering. [laughter] i really enjoy that. and this will be the last question please. >> thank you very much for your presentation. you have advocated increased use of power, the obstacles of getting there and have the overcome those obstacles?

>> written extensively about it to the point at least to some degree and was making earlier about the strategic need for the u.s. to protect non military power. look at all the tools. the department of justice has a program -- i hope they have this program where they will assign overseas to a u.s. embassy in denver and assigned him to jakarta. he is part of the ambassadors team and work with indonesians on counter-terrorism law. how do we help them understand our system and, importantly, how do we learn from indonesian's. the u.s. attorney's post back to denver. what a great resource. that program is small, or it was

i would love to see hundreds of u.s. attorneys. they provide a great service and learn so much. in the other examples, commerce, average to of agriculture,. it was much broader than that. the tools of the u.s. government , he's talking about america and our culture. everything that we bring, whether it is private sector such as media or entertainment world how do we think about this at its strategic level and project into these areas that we have secured, areas that may be at risk? i would like to see some strategic framework, and i don't see that now. again, i think it should be in

part a local solution because what our friends and potential allies in somalia need might be totally different in indonesia which requires not just intelligence and data, but empathetic and sending. that is how we know how to protect our power better. a combination of both. so if you have not read his work, i would encourage it. and i should also note that there are a couple of great examples of where that has worked. columbia, very successful counter insurgency. not eliminated yet, but close. al qaeda -- al-qaeda, great progress. very positive examples of how we took our power, soft power, education being a big piece of

that, and put it together in concert with our allies. good question. i think that concludes the q&a. again, let me thank you for the opportunity to come speak with you. great questions, and i wish you all the very best. if nothing else, dream on. thank you. [applause] >> is there a nonfiction of her book you would like to see featured on book tv? send us an e-mail. or tweet us. >> we welcome you to the mansion. >> the first governor, here we have a photograph of he, his wife, and his child. what is interesting is the fact that his granddaughter, she

wrote a book which is a very favorite of many schoolchildren not only here but all over the united states. >> july 7th and 8th book tv and american history tv explore their heritage and literary culture of missouri state capital, jefferson city with the c-span local content vehicles in american history tv inside the governor's mansion. >> the story says he rode his horse up the footsteps of the mansion coming into the dining room, and proceeded to beat his source of its out of this plate warmer as part of the sideboard. now, the comment was that he probably should not be feeding his horse in the governor's mansion, and his comments to them was, i have had to feed more people in this home with less manners and my horse. >> watch for book tv and american history tv in jefferson city missouri july 7th and 8th on c-span to end three.

>> what are you reading this summer? book tv wants to know. >> it is not so much personal but tv because more of nonfiction, but i like to read thrillers. the one that anyone will pick up and be blown away by it is gone grow by gillian's land. it just came out yesterday, i believe. the reviews that have already come in from npr, the new york times, i would have to agree. it is essentially a portrait of of marriage from hell that we learn about because of women disappears. we get her perspective in-reformat. it becomes very clear, neither of them are telling the truth. incumbent upon the readers to figure out how they're lying and

are they lying to themselves. it is just as i described it, a performance. i wanted to stand up and cheer when i read to the end because the ending is so audacious, but it is so right. >> for more information on this and other summer reading lists visit booktv.org. >> and here at book expo america which is the book publishing industry annual convention in new york city, we are joined by drake mcfeely, chairman and president of the norton company. we want to ask you about some of the books that we have. i want to start with this one right behind us. >> of very scary book about a very important subject. this is what happens. humans are moving deeper and deeper into the hinterlands, and as they do so they're getting a lot more animals that are being

transported over to the human population. not just aids and a boa, other kinds of diseases you have not heard of. david has been out steady around the world. bats, monkeys, guerrillas. a wonderful writer. i don't know if you know his book, song of the doe. it will be a very exciting book for us. >> also happening in the u.s. or other nations? >> this is a worldwide phenomenon, obviously. with the transit of people around the world, you know that diseases move very quickly. >> also wanted to ask you about the last refuge that is coming out. >> if you want to understand terrorism, you probably need to understand yemen, and if you want to understand human this is a terrific guide. live there for a long time. speak the language. he has trained our ambassadors going over to yemen.

this is a poor country that, as most people know, it is a very big source for "sandstorm: libya in the time of revolution" and terrorism -- al kaj and terrorism >> david kalman. >> done a book called the 14th day. we are publishing that into an anniversary october 2 doesn't 12. it is going to be an anniversary for the -- the 50th anniversary for the cuban missile crisis. everyone knows the book the 13 stay, the movie the 13th day. david's question is, how about the 14th day, a book mainly from the presidential project at the university of virginia miller center, transcripts from the kennedy white house. how kennedy managed the outcome for making sure that missiles really were removed from cuba to managing congress and the results of the crisis. >> what is mr. coleman's

background? >> the university of virginia history department and the miller center. >> how long have you been chairman and president? >> thirty-six years. i started right out of college. i have been running the place of the last 18 years and chairman since 2000. >> when it comes to e-books what is the breakdown revenue rise? >> we were tracking 21%. that is about industry average. some shun row publishers receive much higher figures, and certainly when we look at our fiction sales on an individual title, on one occasion we saw over 50 percent. >> 50% and more.

>> plateau and it could very well be the 50% range. the interesting thing is that we will plateau. i'm not looking ahead to the death of the printed book but a world where a lot of people enjoy reading books on e-book readers command of the people still enjoy reading ink on paper, and we will be ready for both. >> what is another trend in publishing that we should be looking for in the next couple of years? >> that is interesting. i would say, i watched the growth of the huge conglomerates, but also what is happening with independent publishing houses and like the fact there is more access to the market, and i think that will be a very healthy thing, not only for norden, but for lots of smaller, independence. >> who was north? >> founded the firm in 1923, 89 years old at this point. he had been in the import-export

business. he and his wife who was deeply involved in the founding of the firm had a passion for books. it began as an avocation. he was in the import-export business by day, but started to publish books by nine. three years later he was doing it full time, and the rest is history. >> you just revised and 1920's and print? >> very excited about an initiative with the live right publishing corporation. we have shown that since the early 1970's. the of the publishers of e cummings, first publishers of faulkner, first publishers in the united states of ernest hemingway and the list goes on and on other creative publishing that was being done in the 1920's. the firm went bankrupt in the early 30's, but wound up, as i say, in the 1970's, and norton's hands to the wonderful energy of my colleague we have now revise the intent -- &.

why two of the very first books on the revised live right imprints. >> you're watching book tv on c-span2 at new york city. we have been talking with drake mcfeely, chairman and president of the norton company. >> what are you reading this summer? book tv wants to know. >> i'm wrapping up a citizens of london which came out a couple of years ago. a picture of london during the war and three very prominent people, rather strongly held views that we should get into the war. sent over there by president roosevelt, their foreign aid program. the ambassador had replaced

joseph kennedy, partial to the germans. i suspect that is the reason roosevelt felt at home. a marvelous book about the three of them and their interaction with churchill and their advocacy, their impressive advocacy of of the united states breaking out of the isolationist mother and getting into the war on the map of england. when olsen had previously written a wonderful book, which i highly recommend it called the troublesome in men about the members of parliament who rallied behind winston churchill and opposed the nazis throughout the 30's and arbitrated his rise to the prime minister's job when neville chamberlain fell. so these two books, a great loo